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Abstract
Behavioral research suggests that human learning in some multi-agent systems can be predicted with surprisingly simple
“foresight-free” models. The current note discusses the implications of this research, and its relationship to the observation that
social interactions tend to complicate learning.
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1. Introduction
Shoham, Powers, Grenager [28] ask: “if multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?” Their search for
interesting questions focuses on the observation that the analysis of learning in multi-agent settings tends to be more
complex than the analysis of individual learning. For example, the move from one-person to two-person games opens
the door to phenomena like the role of teaching and reciprocation, as well as learning.
In this comment we try to extend the search for interesting questions by considering the possibility that an increase
in the number of agents can simplify the task of capturing human learning. The basic idea is that in many multi-agent
interactions, the expected effect of each agent on the environment and on other agents may be very small. In addition,
the opportunity to observe the behavior of other agents reduces the importance of exploration.
Multi-agent transportation games are a natural example. Each agent in these games has to select a transportation
route. The aggregate choices determine the payoffs, but the effect of each agent is typically small. And when the agents
can observe each other, exploration is less important. Each agent can learn from the experience of similar agents that
he or she can observe.
Our research suggests that in these and similar games, multi-agent learning can be usefully described and predicted
with surprisingly simple “foresight-free” reinforcement learning models; models that ignore the possibility that current
choices change the environment, and/or provide information needed to maximize long term outcomes. The fictitious
play rule [25] is an example of a foresight-free learning model, in which at trial t , an agent selects the action that has
led to the best average outcomes in the first t − 1 trials. A stochastic variant of this model is considered below.
In Section 2 we review some research that will help illustrate the value of simple learning models in describing
human behavior in the lab. In Section 3 we return to Shoham et al.’s question about what kinds of questions these
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might help answer, involving the speed at which learning converges to equilibrium in different strategic environments,
individual decision making in one-shot tasks, and behavior in natural settings.
2. The value of simple models of human learning in multi-agent settings
We focus on the “descriptive agenda” (see [28]), and consider how learning models capture human behavior ob-
served in the laboratory. As suggested by Shoham et al., an increase in the number of agents increases the set of
feasible strategies, and can complicate models of learning. Indeed, experimental research suggests that agents con-
sider complex reciprocation-related strategies in two-person games (see [24]). Nevertheless, we argue that when the
number of agents is large, simple descriptive models of individual learning can sometimes predict multi-agent learning
surprisingly well.
We do not argue that multi-agent games have simpler equilibria, or that behavior in all large multi-agent games can
be captured with simple models. But the preliminary evidence suggests that there are many interesting and important
multi-agent environments in which behavior can be usefully approximated with simple models. Three observations
that support this assertion are presented below.
2.1. Reciprocation in two- and four-agent settings
In their classic book, Rapoport and Chammah [24] demonstrated that most human agents learn to reciprocate in
certain repeated two-person prisoner dilemma games. In one of their experiments, participants played the game in
Table 1 for 300 trials against the same opponent with immediate feedback after each trial (and without knowing how
many trials would be played). The results showed a low initial rate of cooperation (about 30% in the second block
of 50 trials), and an increase in cooperation with experience. The cooperation rate in the last block was higher than
50%. It is easy to see that these results cannot be captured with a simple learning model that ignores teaching and/or
reciprocation (see [14]). Such models predict a decrease in cooperation over time.
To evaluate this failure of basic learning models, Danieli [8] ran two versions of the experiment described above.
The first was a computerized replication of the original study. The participants were run in cohorts of four that were
divided into two pairs. Each pair interacted 300 times. The results of this condition were very similar to the original
results. The proportion of cooperation in the last block of 50 trials was 65%.
The second condition was identical to the first with the exception that the four participants in each cohort were
randomly re-matched after each trial. This change had a dramatic effect on the results. The proportion of cooperation
in the last block of 50 trials dropped to 15%.
These results suggest that simple foresight-free models that fail to capture 2-person interaction can already do a
much better job at capturing 4-person interaction. The results suggest that the effect of the factors ignored by these
models (like reciprocation and teaching) quickly drop when the number of agents increases.
We note that not only the number of players is important, but also the pattern of interaction. When (even many)
players are paired in fixed pairings for even a few periods, reciprocation and cooperation can develop. For example,
Bereby-Meyer and Roth [4] report an experiment one of whose conditions reproduces the effect earlier observed by
Selten and Stoecker [27] and Andreoni and Miller [1]. When subjects are rematched to play with different counterparts
in a 10-period repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in which the number of periods to be played with the same partner is
common knowledge, the players can learn with experience to cooperate with high probability in the first few periods,
and to cooperate with low probability in the final periods of each repeated game. (Bereby-Meyer and Roth also
show how environmental factors that affect the speed of learning can also have large consequences for how much
cooperation is achieved, a point to which we will return later.)
Table 1
One of the prisoner dilemma games studied by Rapoport and Chammah [24]
Player 1 Player 2
C D
C (1,1) (−10,10)
D (10,−10) (−1,−1)
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Evaluation of the descriptive value of foresight-free learning models in individual choice tasks [11] reveals high
sensitivity to feedback. Foresight-free models fit the observed learning well when the environment is static and the
feedback includes information concerning both the payoffs actually obtained and the foregone payoffs (that would
have been achieved from actions that weren’t chosen). However, models of this type tend to fail when the feedback
is limited to the obtained payoffs. When the feedback is limited, simple foresight-free models tend to predict a strong
“hot stove” effect (learning to prefer the safer alternative, see [9]). Human behavior exhibits a much weaker effect of
this type.
This failure of simple foresight-free models is likely related to the exploration of alternative actions. Exploration
has little effect when foregone payoffs are known, but can drive learning when the feedback is limited. Modeling
human exploration exploratory behavior is not trivial. It seems that humans can learn to increase the exploration rate
when exploration is likely to increase long term expected return. Thus, it seems that the decision to explore involves
some foresight.
This shortcoming of foresight-free learning models appears to be less relevant in the context of multi-agent games
in which others’ actions are observable (see related arguments in [5,7]). When agents can observe the behavior and the
outcomes of similar agents, these observations provide information concerning the foregone payoffs. For example, in
many multi-agent transportation games foregone payoffs can be inferred from the outcomes obtained by other agents.
2.3. Generality and predictive value
In Erev and Roth [13] we examined if basic foresight-free reinforcement learning models that ignore the dynamic
features of the environment can capture behavior in games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium. The data consid-
ered in that paper included results of published experiments that show apparently complex patterns. In some of the
games studied, experience quickly moved behavior towards equilibrium [23], while in other games there was little cor-
respondence between the observed results and equilibrium [29]. Moreover, many of the studies show non-monotonic
learning trends. The left-hand side of Fig. 1 presents five of the twelve games analyzed in that paper. The experimental
results and equilibrium predictions are summarized in the left-hand column by the proportion of “A” choices.
The right-hand columns show the results of computer simulations in which virtual agents that behave according
to simple foresight-free learning models play each of the games. The virtual experiments were run under the same
conditions as the original studies. In particular, they included the same number of trials as the original studies. The
results show that all three models presented in Fig. 1 capture the main behavioral trends. Good fit between the models
and observed behavior was obtained both when the observed behavior is near and far from equilibrium predictions.
It is important to emphasize that the high correspondence between the observed human behavior and the models is
not a result of overfitting the data. Similarly good correspondence was observed when the parameters of the learning
models are estimated on one set of games, and used to predict behavior in a second set of games. A clear demonstration
of this point is provided in [15]. That paper uses a stochastic variant of the fictitious play model (see [16,17]) to predict
behavior in ten randomly selected constant sum games. The probability of selecting alternative k at trial t is modeled
as:
Pk(t) = e
qk(t)λ/s(t)
∑2
j=1 eqj (t)λ/s(t)
(1)
where qj (t) is the propensity to select strategy j , λ is a payoff sensitivity parameter, and S(t) is a measure of experi-
enced regret.
The adjusted propensity to select alternative j at trial t + 1 is:
qj (t + 1) = (1 − w)qj (t) + w · xj (t) (2)
where xj (t) is the payoff of j in trial t , and w is a parameter that determines the weight of this payoff. The initial
value is qj (1) = 0.
The level of experienced regret, S(t), is modeled as the weighted average of the difference between the obtained
and the maximal payoff:
S(t + 1) = (1 − w)S(t) + w∣∣max(t) − xj (t)
∣
∣ (3)
426 I. Erev, A.E. Roth / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 423–428Fig. 1. Repeated 2 × 2 games [21,29]. In the top four games each payoff unit increases the probability of winning (by 1/6 in S&A2, by 1/8 in
S&A8, and by 1/10 in S&A3k and S&A3u). In M&L payoffs were directly converted to money. Each cell in the left-hand column presents the
experimental results: The proportion of A choices over subjects in each role (grouped in 5 to 8 blocks) as a function of time (200–210) trials in all
cases. The three right-hand columns present the models’ predictions in the same format. The equilibrium predictions are presented at the right-hand
side of the data cells. (Adapted from [13].)
where max(t) is the maximal payoff obtained in trial t over the 2 alternatives. The initial regret level is set to equal
S(1) = λ. The parameters of the models were estimated by Ert and Erev’s [16] in a study of individual decisions. The
estimated value are w = 0.45, and λ = 2.7.
The value of the model’s predictions was assessed by computing the model’s equivalent number of observations
(ENO). A model’s ENO is an estimate of the expected size of the experiment that has to be run so that the mean
observations are more accurate than the models’ predictions. The estimated ENO of the learning model was 16.7.
That is, the model’s prediction of how subjects would behave in a given game is more accurate than the prediction
based on the average behavior of 16 other pairs of subjects observed playing the same game. In comparison the
estimated ENO of the equilibrium prediction is 1.17. That is, equilibrium provides a better prediction of how a pair of
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prediction as can be made by observing two pairs of players.
Additional studies show that the good predictive value of simple learning models is not limited to two-person games
with unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Similar results were observed for extensive form games [26]; Coordination
games [12], and team games [6]. In those papers, learning models were able to predict human behavior both in games
in which observed behavior converged quickly to equilibrium, and in games in which behavior remained persistently
far from equilibrium.
3. Three questions
Research such as that reviewed above suggests that the study of learning in multi-agent systems can shed light on
some important questions.
One question is, in what environments does human learning converge to equilibrium behavior in the intermediate
term? (That is, should we expect to see learning in multiplayer economic environments proceed on a time scale that
would allow equilibration to occur faster than big changes in an economic environment? Or fast enough to observe
equilibration in the lab? see cf. [26].)
The model presented above and the data it summarizes suggest that the answer is “no” in at least some important
cases, and “yes” in others.
One environmental factor that robustly slows learning in games is payoff variability (see [4,18,22]). This is con-
sistent with the observation from the psychology literature that partial reinforcement (adding randomness to the link
between an action and its consequences while holding expected payoffs constant) slows learning. This effect can be
considerably magnified in multiplayer games such as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. When others are slow to learn
to cooperate, the benefits of cooperation are reduced, which further hampers cooperation. That is, in a game, what
there is to learn depends at least in part on what others are learning. Bereby-Meyer and Roth observed that a small
change in the payoff environment, which changes the speed of individual learning, can thus have a large effect on
collective behavior. These results suggest that there may be interesting comparative dynamics that can be derived by
paying attention to the fact that at least some behavior is learned from experience.
Closely related to this is the question of whether learned decisions, i.e. decisions made from experience, are similar
to decisions that are made based on a complete description of the incentive structure (like the decisions studied in
Kahneman and Tversky’s [19] classic work). The answer again is, at least sometimes, no.
Indeed, some of the deviations from rational choice observed in decisions made from experience are in the opposite
direction of the deviation from rational choice captured by prospect theory. In particular, prospect theory implies
oversensitivity to low probability outcomes, and decisions from experience reflect under sensitivity to these events
(see [3]). The high estimated weighting parameters (w = 0.45) reflect high sensitivity to recent outcomes. Therefore,
rare events that are not likely to occur recently receive, in many cases, little attention.
A third question involves the practical implications of the behavioral research considered here. Specifically, can
the study of human learning in the lab shed light on human behavior in natural settings? We believe that the answer
to this question is yes. In this respect we are encouraged by the robustness of the experimental results. The fact that
a wide set of experimental conditions can be captured with a simple 2-parameter model suggests that the observed
behavior reflects general behavioral tendencies. We are similarly encouraged by observations of interesting empirical
phenomena that reflect underweighting of rare events and the payoff variability effect (see review in [10]). An im-
portant example is the “it won’t happen to me” phenomenon: the observation that people tend to violate safety rules
even when this behavior impairs their expected utility. Finally, when we are able to compare laboratory results with
the behavior that we observe market participants learning in field environments (see e.g. [2,20]), what we see in the
lab substantially reproduces what we see in the field.
4. Summary
Most studies of multi-agent learning focus on fact that the social interaction complicates the learning task. Here
we highlight the fact that in certain settings an increase in the number of agents reduces the sensitivity of the learning
process to exploration and environment-modifying strategies. (One way to think about this is by analogy to environ-
ments in which each player has a negligible effect on the environment, so that people may behave as what economists
428 I. Erev, A.E. Roth / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 423–428call “price takers”, essentially treating their environment as fixed, even when the collective behavior that this produces
plays a large role in shaping the environment.) Early evidence suggests that in these settings many important aspects
of human behavior can be captured with surprisingly simple foresight-free learning models. While these foresight-free
models may shed little insight into human thinking, we believe that they shed light on important behavioral questions,
about how people learn to respond to the incentives in their environment. They capture nontrivial properties of human
behavior.
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